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Abstract 
In this study, the primary question that is addressed is that of whether there exists a 
relationship between juvenile arrest rates and public school funding. Using publically 
available FBI arrest data, data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), and Census 
data, I used two OLS models to answer this question. The first model suggested that there 
was no statistically significant correlation between school spending per child and juvenile 
arrest rates. However, it indicated that juvenile arrest rates were correlated with median 
income, percentage of children below the poverty line, percentage of Black, Hispanic, 
and Mixed children in the state. The second model had conflicting results. The model 
suggested that with a $1000 increase in school spending per child, there would be a 0.46 
percentage point decrease in juvenile arrest rates. In addition, it maintained that there was 
a statistically significant correlation between median income and juvenile arrest rates; 
however, the direction of the effect was positive.   
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I. Introduction   
 Numerous studies from varying disciplines have tried to explain the determinants 
and causes for juvenile delinquency. Attempts to understand this problematic and 
complex subject have given rise to a number of psychological, sociological, and 
biological theories that aim to understand criminal behavior in children. Sociological 
theories regarding delinquent behavior primarily focus on the effects of disorganization 
in society, and how that leads to the adoption of crime by children as a means to meet 
their goals. The Psychodynamic Theory and Social Learning Theory are two of the most 
influential theories in psychology that focus on the child’s internal conflicts and the 
child’s relation with the outside world in acquiring behaviors that can be classified as 
delinquent (Siegel and Welsh 2012).  
Studies have shown that young children that display delinquent behaviors are 
more likely to have higher incarceration rates in adulthood (Tanner et al. 1999), showing 
that juvenile delinquency is a serious problem, with lifelong implications for not only the 
offenders, but the society that they affect. Biological, psychological, and sociological 
theories attribute causes of delinquency to familial, social, heritable, and other such 
factors (see for example Jensen 1976; Heimer 1996; Haynie and Osgood 2005). The 
causes that these theories attribute delinquency to are dynamic and difficult for public 
policy to control, therefore making the study of juvenile delinquency, its causes and 
possible preventative measures, not only an interesting but increasingly complex arena of 
research. However, these theories fail to incorporate the effect of education and school 
funding or quality in their assessment of delinquency and its determinants. 
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Education in itself is a vast subject, as it can be further broken down into smaller 
facets such as attainment, school rankings, funding, attendance, and so on. A large 
number of studies have tried to find links between education and crime; however, there is 
little proof to support the claim that crime can be somehow curbed by the use of 
education (Witte 1997)1. Although school funding and crime has not been looked into in 
great detail.  
The question that my thesis primarily tackles is that of spending per child and 
delinquency rates. Is an increase in spending per child indicative of a lower rate of 
juvenile crime? My thesis is essentially a precursor to the question of how public policy 
can be altered such that juvenile crime rates can be lowered, perhaps by a change in 
public school funding.  
In order to answer this question I used state level data with two OLS models. The 
first model failed to show any statistically significant link between juvenile arrest rates 
and spending per child, however suggested that with a dollar increase in median income, 
juvenile delinquency rates were negatively affected by 0.00018 percentage points, and 
with an increase in children below the poverty line delinquency decrease by .35 
percentage points. In addition an increase in Black, Hispanic and mixed children would 
result in an increase in juvenile delinquency by 0.17, 0.18, and 0.03 percentage points 
respectively. My second model had conflicting results, as it showed that spending per 
child had negative effect on juvenile delinquency. The model suggested that with a $1000 
increase in spending, the associated juvenile arrest rates decrease by 0.46 percentage 
1 According to Lochner and Moretti (2004), this may be due to the limited number of studies that Witte 
(1997) had access to.  
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points. Since spending per child is the variable of interest, this was the most valuable 
finding of the model. In addition, the second model suggested a positive correlation 
between median income and juvenile arrests.  
II. Literature Review 
Models on understanding criminal behavior fall into three broad categories: 
economic, sociological, and psychological  (Stacey, 1998). The economic models that 
analyze criminality can further be broken down into the way that they aim to link certain 
behaviors to economic outcomes, and consequently economic circumstances to 
behavioral outcomes. A large number of the economic models look at criminal behavior 
from a labor economics viewpoint and in terms of foregone earnings (see for example, 
Becker 1965; Flinn 1986; Lochner and Moretti 2004). 
Becker (1965) was one of the first economists to develop a model to understand 
criminal behavior. The model focused primarily on the allocation of time between labor 
and leisure, and the significance of forgone earnings. The idea that there is an inverse 
relation between labor and leisure was not a novel one. However what distinguished 
Becker’s model was that he introduced the idea the there exist many different types of 
uses of time and consumption goods, that when combined, produce commodities that 
give us utility (Becker 1965). Therefore the model can be used to equate leisure to crime, 
and understand how that affects the consumption goods and budget constraint. However, 
the model did not account for educational attainment, achievement, or the quality of 
schools in the decision to allocate time. 
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Flinn (1986), states that every econometric model that has tried to quantify the 
reasons for criminal behavior has three essential characteristics. The assumption that the 
individual is rational and seeking to maximize their utility, an attempt to control for the 
risk factor associated with criminal behavior, and a strong focus on the monetary gains 
the individual receives by engaging in such activity. However, the “psychic rewards” are 
ignored by the assumption that all individuals have identical preferences. He highlights 
the flaw in this assumption by stating that differences in behavior arise from the different 
choices that the individual faces, and further emphasizes the need for a dynamic model 
that includes differentiating factors in behavior. He includes education in his model 
through the claim that it influences personal choices and behaviors by means of making 
the individual aware of the consequences of certain activities. Education does not take the 
center stage in the model; however the indication that education influences personal 
choice is an important one.  
Lochner and Moretti (2004) established a relationship between crime and 
schooling through the lens of “social returns” to investment. Instead of focusing on the 
personal returns an individual receives from staying in school, the social benefits of those 
around the individual are studied. In the same vein, they shift the focus to crime, and how 
educational attainment could be used as a method to lower crime rates. Much like Flinn 
(1986), they build on the idea that education influences personal preferences, and would 
thus affect the decision to engage in criminal activity. Their study analyzes educational 
attainment and its effect on incarceration. They first looked at the effect of one additional 
year of schooling and the probability of being incarcerated, and found .10 percentage 
point drop for Whites and .37 percentage point drop for Blacks. In order to analyze the 
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type of crime that inmates have been charged with, they looked at from FBI Uniform 
Crime Report data. Their findings using this data were consistent with their previous 
findings; however they found that education had a large negative effect on murder, 
assault and motor vehicle theft. 
Jacob and Lefgren (2003) studied the short term effects of school on crime. 
However, rather than looking at post high school graduation crime, they focused on 
delinquency.  They suggested that perhaps if schools days were longer and children were 
kept busy, they would not have time to partake in criminal activity. They analyzed school 
calendars and daily criminal activity, along with taking into account the kind of crime, 
property or violent crimes that were reported.  Their study suggested that juvenile 
property crime decreased by 14 percent; however violent crime increased by 28 percent 
when school is in session. They attributed these findings to the interaction of children 
with one another, rather than more incidents being reported during the school year. Their 
findings draw attention to the volatile nature of these children as well as the kind of 
interactions that take place during school hours. Thus implying that behavioral tendencies 
are a key determinant of criminal outcomes.  
The second facet of economic models that study criminal behaviors take a more 
sociological and psychological approach (see for example Sampson and Groves 1989; 
Moffitt 1993). Sampson and Groves tested Shaw and McKay’s2 theory of social 
disorganization. They viewed schools as social organizations, thus crediting criminal 
2Shaw and McKay’s theory suggests that ecology and environment, especially in urban areas where they 
found higher instances of delinquency, plays a large factor in criminal behavior outcomes. They theorized 
that the part of the city with social disorganization and higher poverty will have children with higher 
tendencies to commit crimes, as they emulate the behaviors of older offenders.  
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behavioral tendencies in adolescents to peer effects and friendships or social groups 
rather than the quality or funding of schools. Sampson and Groves hypothesized that 
factors such as higher ethnic diversity, low income, unstable families and residential 
mobility lead to social disorganization, which consequently lead to an increase in 
delinquency and crime. Their model tested for social organization by measuring 
neighborhood friendships, organized participation, and control of street corner peer 
groups. Their results supported the theory, showing a direct linkage between social 
disorganization and criminal behavior.  
In the same vein, Deming (2011) examined the effect of high school allotment on 
crime. Since school allotment is traditionally done based on neighborhoods, this study 
further tests the effect of “social organization” on criminal outcomes. In the model, he 
used public school choice lotteries in Charlotte-Mecklenburg school (CMS) district to 
examine the effect of attending a good quality school on adult crime. Between the years 
1971 and 2001, school allotment in the CMS district was according to race in order to 
maintain racial balance in schools. However, in 2001, children were reassigned to schools 
according to newly drawn school district boundaries. Admission to the district school was 
guaranteed, but parents could submit up to three school choices for the open enrollment 
lottery. Children were then assigned random lottery numbers, which determined if they 
got the school of their choice-lottery winners, or if they didn’t-lottery losers. He 
hypothesized that the lottery winners would have much fewer and less serious criminal 
outcomes, therefore implying that children who attended a better quality school would 
have better life outcomes, and would be less likely to engage in criminal activity. He 
measured the quality of the school by school rankings, and teacher and peer inputs. Using 
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an OLS model, he found that after seven years of this random assignment, children who 
were lottery winners ended up being arrested for lesser serious crimes and rate of 
incarceration was also lower. In addition, he found that behavioral outcomes in middle 
school were largely influenced by peer effects, whereas in high school, the quality of the 
school was a major determinant.  
By focusing exclusively on juvenile delinquency and how increased or decreased 
public school funding at a state level contributes to criminal outcomes in minors, my 
thesis adds to the current literature. Due to the nature of the explanatory and control 
variables included in my model, it is quite similar to Sampson and Groves (1989). 
However, rather than concentrating on urban settings and neighborhood social 
organization, I focus on public school funding by state. The studies that I have discussed 
focus largely on the role of social organization and settings in conjunction with 
neighborhood poverty, low income families, and crime, but do not touch upon public 
school funding as a key component in the model of juvenile delinquency.  
Instead of viewing crime-education as a labor-leisure function (Flinn, 1986), I 
view it as a function of better schools, as I am not trying to explain the psychological or 
sociological factors that come into play when a child chooses to commit crimes rather 
than attend school. Neither am I putting into perspective the social or monetary returns to 
education (Lochner and Moretti, 2004). I am simply trying to understand the effect that 
higher spending per child can have on the juvenile crime outcomes.   
I am interested in understanding whether higher per child expenditure results in 
lower delinquency rates. To do so, I examine whether states with higher public school 
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revenues have lower juvenile crime rates. Therefore I have not limited my study to the 
social or racial effects that influence delinquency, but rather I have tried to answer the 
public policy questions surrounding increased funding, and if increased funding has had 
any impact on juvenile crime.  
III.  Data and Methodology 
This study uses data from three sources. For crime data, FBI data was used, while 
for the other variables, data was taken US Census Bureau and the Current Population 
Survey. Data for the years 2006-2010 was used in order to capture any changes in 
juvenile arrest rates and spending per child that occurred within state. However, there 
were a number of holes in the FBI data, which resulted in the elimination of 17 states 
from the study. These gaps exist due to failure to report crimes by local police stations.  
Due to this failure, the coverage rate of the states was lower than 90%, which rendered 
the data for the state inaccurate and falsely representative of the real crime figures. I only 
included the states which had juvenile arrest data for at least three out of the five years in 
my model due to this shortcoming. The states for which data was unavailable for at least 
three years were eliminated from the sample, and the ones that had three of four 
observations were included with the missing data marked as a missing observation. In 
addition, the FBI data did not report runaways, delinquents that flee before they can be 
arrested. Another disadvantage of the FBI data in that it is not organized according to 
school district. This would have made it a much more meaning full study as the effects of 
property price, and school quality from district to district, could have been studied. 
However, despite its flaws, the FBI data provides a reasonably good estimate of juvenile 
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delinquency in America and for the purposes of this study, as with the current data a state 
level analysis can be conducted that measures the variations within the states and regions 
of the country. 
School funding data from the US Census Bureau for the corresponding years was 
also collected. A cursory look at the sample makes it seem as if larger funds are linked 
with more arrest, which is quite counter intuitive. A large part of this is due to the sheer 
number of children and sizes of schools. In order to control for this effect, I calculated 
rates of juvenile arrests and spending per child, using population data from 2010, the total 
government spending, and total juvenile arrests. These rates were used in the model, so 
that number of children could be controlled for. In addition, race, median income, 
children below poverty line, and state and region dummy variables were included in the 
model to control for their effects on delinquency. For the control variables, just data from 
the census year 2010 was used, and for median income data from 2006-2010 was used 
(For variable descriptions see Appendix I, Table 1). 
By calculating rates, I found that the difference in spending per child between 
states was very large. The average expenditure per child for the 35 states in my sample 
across all 5 years was $8009, with a standard deviation of $2190 (See Appendix II, Table 
1.1). This was highly indicative if the discrepancy and inequality between the states. In 
2010, Connecticut spent $12,030 per child, where as Arkansas spent a mere $5930, 
further exemplifying the existing disparity. States such as Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey and New York had consistent higher per child spending. Arizona, Arkansas, 
Idaho, and Utah had consistent low per child spending. Another interesting observation 
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was that states with over 50% white children generally had higher per child spending than 
those with a more diverse population make up.  
In addition, the use of state level data warrants the inclusion of state and region 
fixed effects in the two models that I have used to answer the question of whether higher 
school expenditure in linked to lower juvenile arrest rates. Due to the falling rates of 
crime in the country, coupled with the increasing average per child expenditure, a 
concern was the influence of this trend hampering the results of the data. In order to 
control for this, I included year fixed effects in my second model. The multiple 
specifications in each model serve as a basis of comparison as to how much the excluded 
variables matter in the model.  
IV. Results  
In order to examine the relationship between government spending and juvenile 
arrests, I divided the states into three categories according to their per student level of 
spending. If the spending was $10,000 and over they were classified as “high-spending”, 
below $10,000 to $6000 was medium spending and below $6000 was low spending. 
Grouping the states together according to the level of spending made analysis of 
corresponding juvenile arrest rates easier and more effective. The high spending states 
had a substantially lower average of juvenile arrest rates that the lower and medium 
spending states. However, the difference between medium and low spending states was 
not only slight, but also counterintuitive. Medium spending states had a higher average 
juvenile arrest rate at 3.12%, whereas low spending states had an average juvenile arrest 
rate of 3.01%. It is perhaps slightly more accurate to compare the summary statistics of 
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juvenile arrests only in the year 2010 and the other variables for which we only have 
2010 data. Doing this for the three categories, it was found that the average juvenile 
arrest was still lowest for high spending states at 2.18%. The average juvenile 
delinquency rate however medium spending states was still more than that of low 
spending states by 0.171 percentage points. This is more or less consistent with the 
summary statistics of juvenile arrest rates for all 5 years. (See Appendix II, Tables 1.2-
1.6) 
I attribute the results of the medium and low spending states to the fact that other 
important variables were not controlled for. This is an important observation, as it was 
indicative of the large role that the other factors may play in the increase or decrease of 
delinquency. From the summary statistics, it can be noted that states with higher spending 
not only have lower juvenile arrest average, but also are less racially diverse, with an 
average of 66% white child population, and a maximum of 90.64% white child 
population in Vermont, which also has the lowest rate of juvenile delinquency at 0.99%. 
Higher spending states also have a higher average median income, as well as a lower 
average rate of children below poverty line. (See Appendix II, Table 1.7 ) 
Another probable cause for the results was that perhaps juvenile delinquency is only 
affected by spending if the amount of spending is substantially high. The average juvenile 
delinquency rate for high spending states was 2.44%, 0.68 percentage points away from 
the medium spending states and 0.56 percentage points away from the lower spending 
states. The difference in the average juvenile delinquency for medium and low spending 
states is 0.11 percentage points for all years and 0.171 for 2010. While the difference in 
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average arrest rates between low and high spending states in 2010 is 0.63 percentage 
points and the difference between average arrest rates in medium and high spending 
states is 0.46 percentage points. Therefore, while the difference between average rates of 
juvenile arrests maybe marginal between medium and low spending states, it can be 
concluded that high spending states have, in comparison, a substantially lower average 
juvenile arrest rate.  
However, without controlling for the other variables, any result or analysis would be 
flawed and incomplete. Descriptive summary statistics tells us very little about the actual 
causality, and validity of my hypothesis that increased public school funding will result in 
lower juvenile delinquency. 
Another factor that was essential to take into account was that of variation in public 
school funding in a state, and how that variation has had an effect on juvenile crime. I 
selected two of the highest spending states and two of the lowest spending states and 
compared their yearly per child expenditure and the corresponding juvenile arrest rate. 
The consistently high spending states being New York and New Jersey, and low spending 
states being Idaho and Utah. There was a common theme in all four states, that with a rise 
in spending per child, there was a decline in juvenile delinquency rates. However, the 
most interesting trends were observed in the low spending states. Idaho, there was a sharp 
fall in the juvenile delinquency arrest rate in 2007, which coincided with an increase in 
spending per child. The same trend was noticed in Utah, where a sharp increase in 
spending in 2008 occurred with a steep drop in juvenile arrest rates. (See Appendix II, 
Graphs 1-4) 
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To further probe the relation between juvenile arrest rates and spending per child, I 
constructed a correlation table (See Appendix II, Table 3.1). The correlation between per 
child spending and juvenile arrest rates was -14.58%, giving further evidence that to my 
hypothesis that there exists an inverse relationship between the two. I found that median 
income and children below the poverty line were highly correlated with spending per 
child, at 44% and -52% respectively, which is indicative of the large role that income 
levels have to play in the allocation of schools funds, and the effect that that may have on 
the analysis.  
I use two OLS models that primarily answer the question of whether higher public 
school funding is associated with lower juvenile delinquency rates. By using state level 
values, some of the effects that would most likely taint the analysis of the relationship, 
such as social effects, and neighborhood differences, are eliminated. This is due to the 
fact that the data is representative of the state as a whole, including richer and poorer 
school districts, rather than the individual schools, which may differ largely from one 
school district to another.  
(1) First OLS Model  
I estimate the model: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Where 𝑌= Juvenile delinquency rate, and 𝑠𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ is public school expenditure per child. 𝑋 
is representative of all the other explanatory variables in the model, which are: rate of 
children below the poverty line, median income, race (White, Black, Asian, Hispanic, and 
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Mixed). I also include region fixed effect dummies (South, West, and North-East), and 𝑖= 
State. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽1, or the coefficient on spending per child.  
I estimated three specifications for the 5 years. I have primarily used the results 
for 2010 as a basis for comparison, as that is the most recent year of the data set. Starting 
with 2010, in the first specification, I only included the two focus variables, juvenile 
delinquency and spending per child. This was a very simplistic model just to get an 
understanding of the relation without any controls. As I expected, the R-squared was very 
low at 2%, and the adjusted R-squared was -0.84%. The coefficient on spending per child 
was -0.06, which implied that a unit ($1000) increase in spending per child was 
correlated with a 0.06 percentage point drop in juvenile arrest rate. Though this was not 
at all statistically significant at the 𝑝<0.05 level. (See Appendix II, Table 2.1) 
For the second specification, I included the all of the control variables, but for the 
regional fixed effect dummies. The R-squared of this model was 44%, significantly larger 
than the first version of the regression. At the 𝑝<0.05 level, spending per child still 
remained statistically insignificant, with a negative coefficient of 0.01, indicating that a 
$1000 increase in spending per child was correlated with a 0.01 percentage point 
decrease in juvenile arrest rates. Median income and children below poverty line were 
statistically significant at the 𝑝<0.01 level, with negative coefficients of -0.00021 and -
0.44. Thus implying that a unit increase in median income would result in a 0.00021 
decrease in juvenile arrest rates, and that a percentage point increase in children below 
poverty line would result in a 0.44 percentage point decrease in juvenile arrest rates. In 
addition, the variable for the percentage of Hispanic children had a positive coefficient of 
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0.16, which was statistically significant at the 𝑝<0.05 level. The other variables were 
statistically insignificant at the 𝑝<0.05 level.  
The final specification, including region fixed effects, gave results largely 
consistent with those of the second specification; however the R-squared was 57%, 
significantly larger than the r-squared of the second specification. The coefficient on 
spending per child remained statistically insignificant at the 𝑝<0.05 level. Just as the 
second specification, median income and children below poverty line were statistically 
significant at the 𝑝<0.01 level with negative coefficients of -0.00018 and -0.35 
respectively. Implying that a unit increase in median income would result in a 0.00018 
percentage point decrease in juvenile arrest rates and a percentage point increase in 
children below the poverty line would result in a 0.35 percentage decrease in juvenile 
arrest rates. The effect of children below poverty line was once again very counter 
intuitive. The effect of median income and children below poverty line having an 
extremely high correlation with spending per child was apparent through the second and 
third specifications of my model. 
The results of my initial regressions went against my hypothesis that juvenile 
arrest rates and spending per child would be inversely related; as the model suggests that 
there is no correlation between the two. However, the most important observation was 
that of the effect of median income, children below the poverty line, percentage of Black, 
Hispanic and mixed children. The next step in my analysis was to estimate the same 
specifications for the other years in my data set. I excluded the variable capturing 
children below poverty line in each state, as my dataset did not include the values for all 
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five years. In addition, seeing from the correlation table median income and children 
below the poverty line essentially measures the same thing and are highly correlated. The 
effect of the financial crisis in the 2006-2010 time frame would have made a large dent in 
income levels and children below the poverty line; they would have changed in a 
significant way.  
For 2009, the first specification yielded very similar results as the results for the 
year 2010 (See Appendix II, Table 2.2). However for the second specification, the 
coefficient on spending per child remained negative, -0.06; but this was not statistically 
significant. In addition, the coefficients on race were also quite different in 2009 than in 
2010, primarily in terms of the direction of their effect, rather than the magnitude. In the 
third specification, the coefficient on spending per child was 0.093, implying a positive 
relation between juvenile arrest rates and spending. The result was similar to that of 2010. 
However, none of the variables were statistically significant.  
In the 2008 model, I noticed that for the first specification the result were 
extremely similar to the 2009 and 2010 results. They differed only very slightly (See 
Appendix II, Table 2.3). However for the second and third specifications it was more 
similar to 2009 than 2010. The sign changes on the coefficients on the controls for race of 
children were identical to that of 2009. And the R-squared values were very similar as 
well. However, just as for 2009, the results were not statistically significant and therefore 
not viable sources of information for the relationship between juvenile delinquency and 
spending per child.  
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For 2007, I noticed that while the first specification stayed similar once again, the 
second and third specifications had different coefficients for the race controls, but similar 
coefficients for spending per child. The most significant change was that in the direction 
of the coefficients on race controls and not the magnitude, again, very similar to the 
results of the 2009 and 2008 specifications. The r-squared for the third specification was 
quite high at 32%, however with no statistical significance on the coefficients of the 
variables, little can be concluded about the question of juvenile arrests.   
For 2006, the pattern of the first specification stayed constant to the previous 
regressions. Once again, the only noticeable change was that of the direction in which 
race was affecting the arrest rates in the second and third specifications. The r-squared of 
the third specification was 33%, making the specification for more accurate than the first 
two specifications for 2006.Due to the low statistical significance associated with 
spending per child, the question of juvenile arrests and public school funding was left 
unanswered. However, table 2.1 is indicative of a relation between children below the 
poverty line, median income, and juvenile arrests, as well as a relation between Hispanic, 
Black and children of two or more races. From the simple summary statistics, it was 
evident that high spending states were characterized by lower diversity and higher 
median income, and the 2010 specification of the model strengthened that claim.   
However, the key variable that is being focused on is public school funding, or 
spending per child, for which there was no statistical significance found in the various 
specifications of the first model. In order to control for the overall variations through year 
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and state in the sample, I looked at a second model to try and understand the relation 
between juvenile arrests and public school funding.  
(2) Second OLS Model  
In the second OLS model, I attempted to look at the question in a different way by 
capturing the effect of change in the 2006-2010 time frame, I estimated a second model 
where: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡=α+𝛽1𝑠𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡+𝛽2𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡+𝜃𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝑌= Juvenile delinquency rates  
𝑠𝑝𝑑𝑐ℎ= Spending per child 
𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑐= State median income 
𝜃= Individual state fixed effect dummies 
𝛾= Year fixed effect dummies 
𝑡= Year 
𝑖= State 
The individual state dummies are included to soak up any fixed state effects that 
there might be in the regression. I included only spending per child and median income as 
explanatory variables in the model, as the sample had data for all 5 years. In addition, I 
included year fixed effects in order to control for the effect of falling crime rates and the 
increasing per child school expenditure over the past years (See Appendix I, Graph 1 and 
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2). Once again, the coefficient of interest is 𝛽1, or the coefficient on per child school 
expenditure.  
Prior to including the state and year fixed effect dummies, I included a 
specification with just juvenile arrest rates over the five years, and spending per child 
over the five years. The R-squared of this model was very low, 1.94%. The coefficient on 
spending was -0.07, but was not statistically significant at the 𝑝<0.05 level.  
The second specification of the model included the fixed effect state dummies. 
The R-squared was very high at 90.8%. As per my hypothesis, spending per child had a 
negative coefficient of -0.041, implying that with every $1000 increase in spending, 𝑌𝑡 
decreased by 0.041 percentage points, however this was not statistically significant at the 
𝑝<0.05 level. The constant for the equation was positive, and statistically significant at 
the 𝑝<0.01 level. (See Appendix II, Table 3.1) 
However, an important variable that has not been controlled for is median income. 
The time frame 2006-2010, coincides with the financial crisis that occurred in late 2008. 
The financial crisis is bound to have had a significant effect on median income and 
children below poverty line across all states. From Table 3.1, it is clear that median 
income and child poverty play an important role in determining juvenile arrest rates. 
Therefore median income has to be controlled for in the model, so that an accurate 
picture of juvenile arrests can be derived. Therefore the third specification of the model 
included the vales for median income for all 5 years per state, so that the effect of the 
financial crisis could be accounted for in the analysis.  
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In the third specification of the model, the inclusion of median income resulted in 
an interesting output. Median income had a negative coefficient in the previous 
regressions, however in the third specification of the second model, the coefficient was 
0.00004, and was significant at the 𝑝<0.01 level. Indicating that with a unit increase in 
median income, juvenile delinquency increased by 0.00004 percentage points. This was 
clearly very counter intuitive; however, with the absence of year fixed effects, the 
influence of falling crime rates goes unchecked. The coefficient on spending per child 
was -0.07, and was not statistically significant.  
The fourth specification of the model included the year fixed effects, in order to 
control for the variation in crime over the years. The individual year dummies absorb the 
fixed effects that may skew the results of the model. The coefficient on spending per 
child was -0.46, statistically significant at 𝑝<0.01 level. Indication that the is a correlation 
between spending per child and juvenile delinquency such that with a $1000 increase in 
per child public school expenditure, delinquency rates drop by 0.46 percentage points. In 
addition, the results suggest that median income and juvenile arrest rates are positively 
correlated such that a unit increase in state level median income will be associated with a 
0.00004 increase in arrest rate. The coefficient on median income was statistically 
significant at 𝑝<0.01 level. The r-squared of the specification was very high at 95%.  
V. Conclusion  
The aim of this study was to understand how a change in public policy, that is 
increased education funding, can reduce juvenile arrest rates and essentially act as a 
method of crime prevention. Looking at individual states gave a clear picture of the 
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variation in funding within the country and the corresponding variation in juvenile 
arrests.  
The model finds strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that spending per child 
and arrest rates are negatively correlated. However, the failure of my first model to find 
such results can be attributed to a number of causes. Primarily the nature of the crime 
data, as well as exclusion of a number of key variables that may have influenced juvenile 
delinquency. Another reason maybe that there are factors other than just funding that 
attribute to the quality of the school. Management of funds, quality of teachers, social 
effects associated with peers, academics, and co-curricular activities are more likely to 
have an effect of the quality of the school and its success rate in having a positive effect 
on children rather than the amount of funding alone.  
From the first OLS model, the results suggest that there is a negative relation 
between median income and juvenile arrest rates, which is quite intuitive. The study 
shows that there is a negative relation between children below poverty line and arrest 
rates, implying that with an increase in poverty, arrest rates drop by 0.35 percentage 
points. This is a very counter intuitive result, as poverty and median income move in 
opposite directions. However, this can perhaps be attributed to the nature of the crime 
observations, since they are representative solely of the arrests, and do not take into 
account runaways or unsolved crimes that may be committed by children. Since children 
living in poverty are more likely to be exposed to delinquent behaviors, perhaps they are 
just better at not getting caught, thus resulting in crime figures that are not fully 
representative of the actual level of juvenile crimes being committed. Another reason 
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maybe the nature of crimes that children living in poverty are likely to commit, and the 
chances that they have of getting arrested. The inclusion of crimes according to property, 
violent, theft, drug use and possession may have been likely to point out what kinds of 
crimes children are most likely to commit, and whether improving the quality of public 
schools can change that. For example, Jacob and Lefgren (2003) found that by extending 
the hours of school, property crimes decreased, but violent crimes increased.  
Another important finding of the model was that of the racial effects on juvenile 
delinquency. The 2010 cohort indicated that a larger number of Black, Hispanic and 
mixed children was associated with an increase in juvenile delinquency. The policy 
implications for such a result are apparent. These are high-risk, socially disadvantaged 
youths that are more likely to engage in delinquent behavior. Previous studies such as 
Sampson and Groves (1989) support the claim that neighborhoods with high ethnic 
diversity generally have higher juvenile delinquency rates. However instead of 
neighborhoods, my model suggests the same for regions.  
The second model suggested a strong negative correlation between juvenile arrest 
rates and spending per child, implying that a $1000 increase in school expenditure per 
child is associated with 0.46 percentage point lower juvenile arrest rates. However, the 
model had conflicting results where median income was concerned. The results indicated 
that an increase in median income was associated with an increase in delinquency. Once 
again the nature of the crime data could be held accountable for the conflicting and 
counter intuitive results. In addition, it could be possible that a number of privileged 
youths were engaging in delinquent behavior just for fun. It would be more telling if the 
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nature of the crimes could be included in the model, as that would give a clearer 
evaluation of which section of society was committing these crimes, and why these 
crimes were being committed in the first place. The important question is what portion of 
delinquent behavior is due to poorly funded schools, and how public policy can be 
changed to minimize the effect of low funding on delinquent behavior. There seem to be 
a lot of other factors that largely control delinquent arrests and behavior.  
Finally, the results of my second model give reason to further probe the 
effectiveness of school funding and education as a means to reduce juvenile crime. In 
addition, education and school quality should take more of a center stage in models 
aiming to explain delinquent behavior. Future studies should aim to include total juvenile 
delinquency levels, and not only arrests. In addition, it would be a more complete study if 
observations for all the years in the sample size could be collected. Perhaps more 
variables could be added to the model in order to control for the effects of the financial 
crisis, and its influence on school funding and budget cuts. The enactment of programs 
such as Common Core and No Child Left Behind would also affect school quality and 
funding, as well as dropout rates and child engagement in schools.  
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APPENDIX I 
Table 1: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Definition  Variable 
Label 
Year  Year 
State  State 
Juvenile Arrest Rates (calculated on 2010 
population estimates) 
 
 
JUVARR 
% of White children in the state   RACEW 
% of Black children in the   RACEB 
% of Hispanic children in the state   RACEH 
% of Asian children in the state   RACEA 
% of Racially mixed children in the state   RACET 
Median Income   MEDINC 
Public school spending per child (calculated 
on 2010 population estimates, thousands of 
dollars) 
 SDPCH 
Binary variable, if state is the South=1  SOUTH 
Binary variable, if state is the West=1  WEST 
Binary variable, if state is the North East=1  NEAST 
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Graph 1: Declining Juvenile Arrests-Nationwide Aggregate 
 
 
 
Graph 2: Increasing per Child School Spending-Nationwide Aggregate 
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APPENDIX II 
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of the entire Sample 
Variable  Observations  Mean St. Deviation Min Max 
Juvenile 
Arrest Rates 
171 2.96 1.16 0.64 8.13 
Spending 
per Child 
175 8.01 2.19 3.8 13.06 
 
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of High Spending States  
Variable  Observations  Mean St. Deviation Min Max 
Juvenile 
Arrest Rates 
35 2.44 1.07 .99 5.43 
White 
Children (%) 
9 66.68 16.08 50.13 90.64 
Hispanic 
Children (%) 
9 14.69 8.57 2.34 23.67 
Black 
Children (%) 
9 7.15 5.55 1.02 15.98 
Asian 
Children (%) 
9 4.35 2.83 .66 9.02 
Mixed 
Children (%) 
9 4.33 3.04 2.85 12.36 
Median 
Income 
35 62222 7250 51209 78632 
Children 
Below 
Poverty Line 
(%) 
9 15.23 2.83 12.5 20.7 
30 
 
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of Medium Spending States 
 Observations  Mean St. Deviation Min Max 
Juvenile 
Arrest Rates 
109 3.12 1.25 .64 8.13 
White 
Children 
(%) 
22 58.95 18.76 13.43 89.84 
Hispanic 
Children 
(%) 
22 16.87 13.75 2.06 51.81 
Black 
Children 
(%) 
22 12.10 9.44 .61 31.65 
Asian 
Children 
(%) 
22 4.37 5.16 .69 25.1 
Mixed 
Children 
(%) 
22 5.57 5.99 2.22 31.67 
Median 
Income 
111 55698.35 7831.012 39681 73734 
Children 
Below 
Poverty Line 
(%) 
22 19.25 4.16 11.9 26.7 
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics of Low Spending States 
Variable  Observations  Mean St. Deviation Min Max 
Juvenile 
Arrest Rates 
27 3.01 .54 1.92 3.98 
White 
Children (%) 
4 64.84 16.39 41.03   76.19 
Hispanic 
Children (%) 
4 21.47 15.34 7.97 43.54 
Black 
Children (%) 
4 6.52 9.02 .83 19.84 
Asian 
Children (%) 
4 1.72 .59 1.11 2.53 
Mixed 
Children (%) 
4 3.26 .16 3.1   3.47 
Median 
Income 
29 51977.41 7182.048 41230 67659 
Children 
Below 
Poverty Line 
(%) 
4 20.1 5.02 13.7 24.2 
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics of High Spending States, Year=2010 
Variable  Observations  Mean St. Deviation Min Max 
Juvenile 
Arrest Rates 
9 2.18 .99 .99 4.44 
White 
Children (%) 
9 66.68 16.08 50.13 90.64 
Hispanic 
Children (%) 
9 14.69 8.57 2.34 23.67 
Black 
Children (%) 
9 7.15 5.55 1.02 15.98 
Asian 
Children (%) 
9 4.35 2.83 .66 9.02 
Mixed 
Children (%) 
9 4.33 3.04 2.85 12.36 
Median 
Income 
9 61164 8378.73 48219 71637 
Children 
Below 
Poverty Line 
(%) 
9 15.23 2.83 12.5 20.7 
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Table 1.6: Summary Statistics of Medium Spending States, Year=2010 
 Observations  Mean St. Deviation Min Max 
Juvenile 
Arrest Rates 
22 2.64 1.004 .64 5.71 
White 
Children 
(%) 
22 58.95 18.76 13.43 89.84 
Hispanic 
Children 
(%) 
22 16.87 13.75 2.06 51.81 
Black 
Children 
(%) 
22 12.10 9.44 .61 31.65 
Asian 
Children 
(%) 
22 4.37 5.16 .69 25.1 
Mixed 
Children 
(%) 
22 5.57 5.99 2.22 31.67 
Median 
Income 
22 52920.77 8537.48 40400 72999 
Children 
Below 
Poverty Line 
(%) 
22 19.25 4.16 11.9 26.7 
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Table 1.7: Summary Statistics of Low Spending States, Year=2010 
Variable  Observations  Mean St. Deviation Min Max 
Juvenile 
Arrest Rates 
4 2.81 .18 2.55 2.98 
White 
Children (%) 
4 64.84 16.39 41.03   76.19 
Hispanic 
Children (%) 
4 21.47 15.34 7.97 43.54 
Black 
Children (%) 
4 6.52 9.02 .83 19.84 
Asian 
Children (%) 
4 1.72 .59 1.11 2.53 
Mixed 
Children (%) 
4 3.26 .16 3.1   3.47 
Median 
Income 
4 49893.75 6053.13 44140   58164 
Children 
Below 
Poverty Line 
(%) 
4 20.1 5.02 13.7 24.2 
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Graph 1.1: Variance in Spending per Child and Juvenile Arrest Rates, New Jersey 
 
 
 
Graph 1.2: Variance in Spending per Child and Juvenile Arrest Rates, New York 
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Graph 1.3: Variance in Spending per Child and Juvenile Arrest Rates, Idaho 
 
 
 
Graph 1.4: Variance in Spending per Child and Juvenile Arrest Rates, Utah 
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Table 1.8: Correlation Matrix 
 Juvenile 
Arrest 
Rates 
White  Hispanic Black Asian  Mixed Median 
Income 
Children 
Below 
Poverty 
Line 
Spending 
per Child  
Juvenile 
Arrest Rates 
1         
White -0.063 1        
Hispanic 0.102 -0.69 1       
Black -0.2 -0.27 -0.114 1      
Asian 0.09 -0.71 -0.26 -0.043 1     
Mixed 0.15 -0.51 -0.05 -0.2 0.81 1    
Median 
Income 
0.18 -0.33 0.18 -0.04 0.51 0.26 1   
Children 
Below 
Poverty Line 
-0.22 -0.96 0.203 0.24 -0.3 -0.214 -0.81 1  
Spending per 
Child  
-0.15 0.95 -0.208 -0.005 0.18 0.012 0.44 -0.52 1 
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Table 2.1: Model 1, Year=2010 
Control Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Spending per Child  -0.06 
(0.071) 
-0.01 
(0.095) 
0.09 
(0.1) 
White Children (%) - 0.08 
(0.061) 
0.113 
(0.06) 
Black Children (%) - 0.115 
(0.07) 
0.17** 
(0.07) 
Hispanic Children 
(%) 
- 0.16** 
(0.07) 
0.18** 
(0.07) 
Asian Children (%) - -0.032 
(0.08) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
Mixed Children (%) - 0.25 
(0.15) 
0.03** 
(0.16) 
Median Income - -0.00021*** 
(0.00006) 
-0.00018*** 
(0.00006) 
Children Below 
Poverty Line 
- -0.44*** 
(0.11) 
-0.35*** 
(0.12) 
Constant  3.05*** 
(0.62) 
11.9 
(6.9) 
5.5 
(6.9) 
Region Fixed 
Effects 
No No Yes 
Observations  35 35 35 
R-squared 0.02 0.44 0.57 
Standard Errors are given in parenthesis  
p<0.01***, p<0.05** 
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Table 2.2: Model 1, Year=2009 
Control Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Spending per Child  -.06 
(0.08) 
-0.08 
(0.11) 
0.093 
 (0.14) 
White Children (%) - 0.04 
(0.08) 
0.078 
(.079) 
Black Children (%) - 0.11 
(0.08) 
0.081  
 (0.085) 
Hispanic Children 
(%) 
- 0.038 
(0.09) 
0.082 
(0.086) 
Asian Children (%) - -0.0003 
(0.11) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
Mixed Children (%) - 0.12 
 (0.2) 
0.18 
(0.2) 
Median Income  - 0.000017 
(0.00003) 
0.000003 
(0.00003) 
Constant  3.36*** 
(0.67) 
-1.12 
(8.7) 
-5.4 
(8.5) 
Region Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Observations  34 34 34 
R-squared 0.02 0.12 0.32 
Standard Errors are given in parenthesis  
p<0.01***, p<0.05** 
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Table 2.3: Model 1, Year=2008 
Control Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Spending per Child  -.064 
(0.098) 
-0.12 
(0.14) 
0.06 
 (0.17) 
White Children (%) - 0.018 
(0.096) 
0.06 
(.094) 
Black Children (%) - -0.003 
(0.097) 
0.09  
 (0.1) 
Hispanic Children 
(%) 
- 0.02 
(0.12) 
0.07 
(0.103) 
Asian Children (%) - -0.034 
(0.13) 
-0.05 
(0.13) 
Mixed Children (%) - 0.09 
 (0.24) 
0.12 
(0.23) 
Median Income  - 0.00005 
(0.00004) 
0.000023 
(0.000035) 
Constant  3.36*** 
(0.84) 
-0.26 
(10.6) 
-4.7 
(10.23) 
Region Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Observations  34 34 34 
R-squared 0.013 0.14 0.35 
Standard Errors are given in parenthesis  
p<0.01***, p<0.05** 
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Table 2.4: Model 1, Year=2007 
Control Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Spending per Child  -.07 
(0.11) 
-0.14 
(0.15) 
0.07 
 (0.19) 
White Children (%) - -0.003 
(0.098) 
0.038 
(.096) 
Black Children (%) - -0.03 
(0.1) 
0.073  
 (0.1) 
Hispanic Children 
(%) 
- -0.01 
(0.11) 
0.039 
(0.104) 
Asian Children (%) - -0.009 
(0.15) 
-0.05 
(0.15) 
Mixed Children (%) - 0.01 
 (0.25) 
0.12 
(0.23) 
Median Income - 0.00004 
(0.00004) 
0.00002 
(0.00004) 
Constant  3.79*** 
(0.88) 
2.44 
(10.9) 
-1.6 
(10.4) 
Region Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Observations  33 33 33 
R-squared 0.015 0.1 0.32 
Standard Errors are given in parenthesis  
p<0.01***, p<0.05** 
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Table 2.5: Model 1, Year=2006 
Control Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Spending per Child  -.05 
(0.11) 
-0.2 
(0.16) 
-0.03 
 (0.23) 
White Children (%) - 0.03 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(.09) 
Black Children (%) - 0.013 
(0.09) 
0.08  
 (0.1) 
Hispanic Children 
(%) 
- 0.02 
(0.1) 
0.05 
(0.098) 
Asian Children (%) - -0.02 
(0.15) 
-0.07 
(0.14) 
Mixed Children (%) - 0.08 
 (0.23) 
0.15 
(0.22) 
Median Income  - 0.00006 
(0.00004) 
0.00004 
(0.00004) 
Constant  3.5*** 
(0.82) 
-1.8 
(9.7) 
-3.13 
(9.7) 
Region Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Observations  35 35 35 
R-squared 0.006 0.14 0.33 
Standard Errors are given in parenthesis  
p<0.01***, p<0.05** 
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Table 3: Model 2  
Control 
Variables  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spending per 
Child  
-0.07 
(0.034) 
-0.041 
(0.043) 
0.006 
(0.044) 
-0.46*** 
(0.043) 
Median Income - - 0.00004*** 
(0.00001) 
0.00004*** 
(0.00001) 
State Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
No No No Yes 
Constant 3.55*** 
(0.04) 
4.7*** 
(0.42) 
1.7 
(1.03) 
7.9*** 
(0.76) 
Observations 171 171 171 171 
R-squared 0.019 0.908 0.914 0.95 
Standard Errors are given in parenthesis  
p<0.01***, p<0.05** 
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